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State Burdens on Resident Aliens:
A New Preemption Analysis
Throughout American history, legally residen, aliens' have been
subjected to numerous restrictions imposed by Congress and state
legislatures.2 When these burdens have been challenged, most courts
have invoked equal protection doctrine to evaluate the validity of the
legislation.3 But that doctrine has been applied with growing incon-
sistency, 4 due in large part to the problematic status of alienage under
1. A resident alien is a person admitted for permanent residence, entitled to work
and live anywhere in the country, and eligible for naturalization after five years of
residence. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1427(a) (1976). Nonresident aliens are those admitted for a
time period fixed prior to entry, such as temporary visitors, students, and trainees. About
460,000 immigrant or resident aliens were admitted in 1977, see [1977] IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 2, compared to more than 8 million nonresident aliens,
id. at 4. In 1977, more than 4.9 million resident aliens were present in the United States.
Id. at 25. In this Note, "aliens" will refer to legally resident aliens unless specifically
noted.
2. See, e.g., J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND 46, 161-62, 183 (1975) (describing history
of American statutory restrictions on aliens). Numerous federal statutes disproportionately
burden aliens. See, e.g., Appendix to Brief for the Petitioners, Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (listing more than 250 statutory provisions drawn from 31 titles
of United States Code that make distinctions between citizens and aliens; listing is exclusive
of Title 8, "Aliens and Nationality," in which the distinction is made in virtually every
provision). State burdens, however, are even more numerous and pose different problems
because the federal government is generally acknowledged to have much wider latitude in
placing restrictions on aliens. See pp. 945-46 infra.
States often exclude aliens from licensed professions and occupations by limiting em-
ployment to citizens or aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 2208 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (dental hygienist must be citizen or
have naturalization papers); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6805(6) (McKinney 1972) (pharmacist must
be citizen or declarant alien); W. VA. CODE § 30-6-5 (1976) (embalmer must be citizen);
D. CARLINER, THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 205-55 (1977) (compiling 388 statutory restrictions
based on citizenship affecting 23 specific occupations for the 50 states). In addition to
regulating entry into private professions, state employment of aliens also is restricted.
See, e.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3001(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (public school teacher must be
citizen or declarant alien); S.D. CoMPti.ED LAWS ANN. § 3-1-4 (1974) (no alien except
declarant alien may be employed by state with minor discretionary exceptions). States
further exclude aliens from use or employment of certain public state resources and bene-
fits, see, e.g., VA. CODE § 28.1-162 (1979) (only citizens may apply to have lands designated
as public clamming or scalloping grounds); Wvo. CONsT. art. 19, § 3 (only citizens and
declarant aliens to be employed on public works), and from ownership of property within
the state, see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-402 (1976) (aliens cannot acquire title to land for
more than five years). The restrictions on aliens are thus far-reaching in subject matter
and found in many of the states.
3. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (aliens denied welfare
benefits); pp. 941-42 infra (discussing Court's use of equal protection in alienage cases).
4. Compare Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (certain aliens can be ex-
cluded from teaching public school) with Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973)
(aliens cannot be excluded from certain state government jobs).
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traditional equal protection.5 The inadequacy of equal protection doc-
trine has prompted some scholars to urge the adoption of a federal
preemption standard for analyzing state regulations that disproportion-
ately burden aliens.0 Because of the plenary federal interest in immigra-
tion, naturalization, and foreign affairs,7 federal preemption provides
an appropriate framework for the analysis of alienage regulations.
Despite the conceptual appeal of preemption doctrine, the full
analytical apparatus needed to reach case-by-case determinations has
never been elaborated. This Note develops such a preemption test,
proposing a standard under which state laws that disproportionately
burden aliens are preempted by the predominant federal interest in
alienage, unless the state regulation is expressly authorized by Con-
gress, or alternatively, can be analogized to a federal regulation from
which an implicit authorization by Congress can be inferred." The
Note then applies the test to the major areas in which the states have
attempted to burden aliens. Its application demonstrates that a pre-
emption model better orders alienage jurisprudence than does equal
protection analysis, and that the proposed test provides a clear and
uniform standard by which courts can determine the limits of per-
missible state burdens on aliens.
I. The Underpinnings of a Federal Preemption Model
In order for a preemption analysis of state burdens on aliens to sup-
plant an equal protection approach, it is necessary to demonstrate both
that federal preemption doctrine is conceptually appropriate to analysis
of alienage regulations and that it is less likely to lead to the confusion
that has resulted from the equal protection model.
A. The Failure of Equal Protection
In 1971, the Supreme Court announced in Graham v. Richardson9
that state classifications based on alienage, like those founded on na-
tionality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to "close judicial
5. See pp. 943-44 infra (discussing problems of treating alienage within traditional
equal protection framework).
6. See C. BLACK, STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 64-65 (1969);
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUmn. L. REv.
1023, 1063-64 (1979).
7. See pp. 944-46 infra.
8. See pp. 948-50 infra.
9. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidating state statutes denying welfare benefits to resident
aliens or conditioning those benefits on longtime residency).
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scrutiny."'10 For the next seven years, the Court proceeded to mold a
new alienage jurisprudence based on this standard," virtually guaran-
teeing that most state legislative distinctions between citizens and aliens
would fall.' 2 More recently, however, the Court has applied a looser,
rational-relationship test without overruling its prior decisions or an-
nouncing a clear basis for its divergence. 13
The cornerstone of this new approach is a "governmental function"
exception which the Court has applied to challenges to alienage regula-
tions. 14 Under this exception, exclusions of aliens from participation in
government are not subject to strict scrutiny. The exception is premised
on the view that the distinction between citizen and alien, arguably
irrelevant in other contexts, is fundamental to the definition and
government of a stateY5
The Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to restrictions barring
aliens from the political process is paradoxical, however, because the
suspect classification device was intended specifically to protect minori-
ties not adequately safeguarded by the political process.'0 Furthermore,
the Court's application of the exception has been disingenuous. Posi-
10. Id. at 372.
11. See Maltz, The Burger Court and Alienage Classifications, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 671
(1978) (detailing evolution of alien cases).
12. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972) (a finding that legislative classification is "suspect" generally fatal to legisla-
tion under "new" equal protection). Indeed, in the years following the Graham decision,
the Court rejected state statutes that excluded aliens from a state competitive civil service,
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), from admission to the practice of law, In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), from state licensing as civil engineers, Examining Bd. v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and from financial assistance for higher education,
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). But see Maltz, supra note 11, at 675 (language in
Sugarman made clear that strict scrutiny would not apply in some instances involving
alienage classifications).
13. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (employing rational-relationship
test to hold that state can refuse to employ public school teachers who are eligible for
citizenship but refuse to seek naturalization); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96
(1978) (upholding New York law excluding aliens from joining the state police under
rational-relationship standard).
14. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1979).
15. Id. The theory underlying the "governmental function" exception is that because
a democratic society is ruled by its people, the state can exclude aliens from participation
in its political institutions as part of the sovereign's obligation to preserve the fundamental
conception of a political community. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96
(1978).
16. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938); Note, The
Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection? 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1079
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Equal Treatment]; cf. Note, A Dual Standard for State Dis-
crimination Against Aliens, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1516, 1521 (1979) (Court has conspicuously
failed to provide persuasive reason for exclusion of aliens from political process) [herein-
after cited as Dual Standard].
942
Restrictions on Aliens
tions such as those of a state trooper 7 or a public school teacher 8
hardly seem equivalent to the policymaking functions envisioned by
the governmental function doctrine. 19 Yet the Court has expanded the
exception to encompass these jobs. In seeming contradiction, the Court
has held that alien lawyers may not be excluded from admission to the
bar on the basis of alienage,20 even though lawyers are "officers of the
court" who frequently bear great influence and responsibility in our
society.21
The current confusion in alienage jurisprudence derives from two
sources. First, the Court has failed to resolve whether alienage, which
possesses only some of the traditional criteria of "suspectness,"22 con-
17. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (disproportionate state burden on
aliens upheld because police officers fulfill a fundamental obligation of government and
exercise broad discretionary powers).
18. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (nondeclarant aliens-those aliens
who have not announced an intention to give up foreign citizenship and become United
States citizens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1445(f) (1976)-can be excluded from public school
teaching).
19. In the Court's most forceful declaration of the doctrine, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 647 (1973), it suggested that aliens may be barred from holding state elective or
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions because occupants of
such positions "participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy." But the governmental function doctrine is weakened by the holding of
that case, which limited state authority to exclude aliens from participation in a state
civil service. Id. at 643. The phrase "execution of broad public policy" must be in-
terpreted to include only actual policymaking or the Sugarman holding becomes unin-
telligible. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 304 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
21. Id. at 728-29; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 663 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). The inconsistency in the Court's position has not gone unnoticed. See Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 88-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (incomprehensible why
aliens can be barred from public-school teaching if not from practicing law); Equal
Treatment, supra note 16, at 1075-79 (demonstrating inconsistencies of Foley and Ambach);
Dual Standard, suPra note 16, at 1532-33 (same). Although the distinction has been made
that lawyers in private practice differ from publicly employed police officers and teachers,
see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 n.6 (1979), the rationale for the governmental
function exception is more sensibly based not on the formalistic criterion whether the
government is the emploser but rather on the public nature of the functions performed
by the employee. Even if the former criterion were controlling, the fact that the govern-
ment is not directly the "employer" should not be dispositive, due to the extent of state
regulation of the legal profession. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1973) (describ-
ing Connecticut regulation of lawyers and legal practice).
22. Like other suspect classes, aliens are marked by a history of prejudice. See J.
HiGHAM, supra note 2, Passim. Moreover, the alien's political isolation, the hallmark of
a "discrete and insular" minority, is the standard trigger for application of strict scrutiny.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). But cf. Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (class of aliens is heterogeneous multitude of persons with
divergent ties to this country).
Alienage can also be characterized as "an immutable characteristic determined solely
by the accident of birth." See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (gender discrimination case citing immutability as criterion of sus-
pectness). In the five years during which an alien is not eligible for citizenship, see 8
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stitutes a suspect class.2 3 A second problem arises from the federal
structure of American government. Regulations that would be con-
stitutionally unacceptable if adopted by a state may be justified by the
overriding national interests underlying federal legislation.2 4
Recognition of the predominant federal interest in alienage -2 sug-
gests the wisdom of measuring state and federal regulations by different
standards. It is therefore logical to begin analysis of state alienage
classifications by looking to the federal interest in the classification and
deciding whether the state interest accords with that federal interest.
B. The Argument for Federal Preemption
Although the Constitution does not mention the power to regulate
immigration, various provisions are deemed to vest Congress with the
power to regulate the entrance and residence of aliens.26 These include
U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976), the status is immutable. See Dual Standard, supra note 16, at 1525.
But alienage generally is not immutable over the long term; it is often a phase on the
road to citizenship. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (alienage unlike other suspect classifications due to ability to leave status);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same). The
alien's ability to remove himself voluntarily from alien status complicates any attempt to
determine the proper level of equal protection scrutiny.
23. The Court has at different moments viewed alienage as a suspect classification, see
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971),
as an exception to a suspect classification, see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 74-75
(1979), and as a non-suspect classification, see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978);
cf. Dual Standard, supra note 16, at 1524 (Court's justification for strict scrutiny of cer-
tain classifications but not others has been elusive). This confusion evidences the evolution
of various levels of scrutiny under equal protection. See Maltz, supra note 11, at 679
(problems of alienage jurisprudence under equal protection are not solved by either two-
tiered or evolving multitiered approach).
24. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 105 (1976) (Civil Service Com-
mission's exclusion of virtually all noncitizens from employment held to be invalid, but
would have been valid if imposed by President or Congress); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 86-87 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers different from constitu-
tional limits on federal power over immigration and naturalization).
Alienage poses particular problems for an equal protection analysis. Identical equal
protection standards are applied to federal and state governments in all areas except
alienage, where the plenary federal interest permits wider federal latitude. See Karst,
The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REv. 541, 560 (1977)
(class of national interests justifying departure from basic equivalence of Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments is extremely narrow, extending only to regulation of aliens by
federal government). Moreover, the national interest in alienage has been held to con-
stitute a political question, subject to narrow judicial review. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954).
25. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941) (regulation of aliens so intertwined
with federal responsibility that state law may be preempted); Equal Treatment, supra
note 16, at 1089-90 (Court has recognized federal predominance in its application of tacit
preemption standard hidden in its equal protection analysis).
26. See C. GORDON & E. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAw § 2.1 (1979);
Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Govern-
ment, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275, 320.
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federal authority over foreign affairs,2 7 the power to make a uniform
rule of naturalization,28 and the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations.2 9 The Supreme Court also has relied on the sovereign
authority of the United States as a nation, an argument independent of
constitutional derivation, as an alternative justification for the pre-
dominant federal interest in alienage.
30
Plenary federal authority for the conduct of foreign affairs yields a
particularly compelling argument for adopting a federal preemption
standard to analyze state alienage classifications. 31 In the conduct of
foreign policy, the President or Congress have need of the power to
exact reciprocal concessions from other nations, or to secure just treat-
ment for Americans living abroad, by manipulating the rights and
opportunities of foreign nationals resident in the United States.32 State
27. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (conduct
of foreign relations vested exclusively in the federal government).
28. U.S. COrsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generally Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization
Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1007 (1976); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Con-
gress to Confer Citizenship by Naturalization, 50 IowA L. REV. 1093 (1965).
29. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In the first hundred years following adoption of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court relied primarily on the federal right to supervise foreign
commerce to invalidate state regulations that encroached on the exclusive federal interest
in immigration. See, e.g., Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 405
(1849) (transportation of immigrants falls under regulation of foreign commerce). When
the federal government commenced a program of immigration control in 1882, it again
turned to the foreign commerce rationale in its successful defense of the federal statute.
See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1884) (validating duty on immigrants).
30. Mr. Justice Sutherland made the most authoritative exposition of the theory that
the foreign relations power derives not from the Constitution, but from the law of nations,
and in fact antedated the Constitution, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936). Cf. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893)
(right to exclude or expel aliens is inherent right of all nations); I C. HYDE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 59 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (same). The Court continues to view such congressional
power as inherent rather than enumerated. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
765-66 (1972) (Court will not look behind executive's exclusion of alien). But see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTITUrIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 283-84 (1978) (positivist theory of sovereignty,
rooted in international law and not the Constitution, is erroneous); Levitan, The Foreign
Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE LJ. 467, 497
(1946) (no place for theory of "inherent" powers in American constitutional system).
31. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (regulation of aliens may implicate
relations with foreign governments); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)
(alien policy tied to conduct of foreign affairs and to other powers entrusted so exclusively
to political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference).
32. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941) (numerous treaties between
the United States and foreign governments pledge not to put discriminatory burdens on
aliens in return for reciprocal concessions). The need for federal control over the rights
of resident aliens was advanced by petitioners in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976), to defend the exclusion of aliens from the federal competitive civil service.
That is, a broad exclusion of aliens would enable the President to offer employment op-
portunities to citizens of a foreign country in exchange for reciprocal concessions, an offer
he could not make if those aliens already were eligible for federal employment. Id. at 104.
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regulations, however, can frustrate such efforts.33 Moreover, serious in-
ternational controversies may arise from real or imagined wrongs to
another's subjects inflicted or acquiesced in by a state government."
The general exclusion or preemption of state legislation encroaching
upon foreign policy should, therefore, serve as a paradigm for analyzing
state regulation of aliens.
States have disputed the exclusivity of federal power by claiming
that some regulations that single out aliens or burden them dispro-
portionately fall within the ambit of state police power.3  Conflict be-
tween state and federal purposes often occurs in areas such as the
regulation of employment relationships, which states have long re-
garded as a quintessential police function. 3
6
To contend that alien regulation falls within state police power,
The Court assumed that such a purpose for imposing a citizenship requirement would
be justified if imposed by the President or Congress. Id. at 105. Such active use of
regulations burdening aliens would be permissible because of the need for a "reciprocity
lever," except to the extent that those burdens would violate constitutional rights of the
aliens. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (plurality opinion of Black, J.) (protec-
tions of Constitution cannot be nullified by treaty or legislation); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (alien is "person" under due process clause entitled to constitutional
protection).
Traditionally, many of the rights of aliens in the United States reflect disparate agree-
ments between the United States and the aliens' respective countries of origin, so that two
aliens in the United States may have very different rights and prospects. See, e.g., L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTIoN 258 (1972) (discrimination among aliens
of different nationality raises no constitutional difficulty if it reflects different agreements
between United States and aliens' respective countries of origin, or if its purpose is to
secure reciprocal treatment for Americans in those countries).
33. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (state regulation of estates must
give way if effective exercise of nation's foreign policy thereby impaired); L. HENKIN,
suPra note 32, at 238-39, 476 n.51. But see Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (state
reciprocity statute as to alien's right to inherit personal property held not to be inter-
ference in foreign affairs). Because Zschernig did not overrule Clark, one might conclude
that not all state actions with foreign implications are interferences in foreign affairs.
However, Zschernig demonstrates that there is a low threshold for establishing interference.
34. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64
(1941).
35. State police power has been described as follows: "[C]ertain powers necessary to
the administration of their internal affairs are reserved to the States . . ., among these
powers are those for the preservation of good order, of the health and comfort of the
citizens, and their protection against pauperism and against contagious and infectious
diseases .. " Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1876). But police power
is limited by the provision that whenever a state statute invades the legislative domain
belonging exclusively to Congress, the statute is void, no matter how closely linked it
may be to powers conceded to belong to the states. Id. at 272.
36. As a consequence of state police power, the states often have attempted to restrict
the access of aliens to various forms of employment. See note 2 supra (citing state statutes);
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (states possess wide authority under police power
to regulate employment relationships). The DeCanas Court said, however, that the state
regulation was aimed precisely at the protection of citizens and legally admitted aliens
from the harmful economic impact of illegal aliens, id. at 356-57, and as such, the state
regulation did not add to the burdens of legally resident aliens, id. at 358 n.6.
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however, obfuscates the uniquely federal character of the alien. Al-
though he resides in a state, the alien is subject to federal supervision
until his naturalization.37 Furthermore, employment is an area in which
the federal government has a special prerogative to circumscribe state
action. Because an alien cannot live where he cannot work,3  the
authority of the federal government to regulate the residence of aliens
must include regulating aliens' rights to employment. 39 State restric-
tions on the conditions for granting welfare and other public benefits
can similarly frustrate federal policy.
40
Thus, the preferred doctrine to protect the dominant national in-
terest in alienage policy ought to be federal preemption. Use of a
preemption standard to review burdens imposed on aliens would
justify the Court's differential treatment of state and federal alienage
classifications, a difference that is anomalous under equal protection
analysis. 41 Moreover, preemption doctrine can be shown to delimit
permissible state classifications more successfully than does equal pro-
tection.
II. Construction of an Effective Preemption Model
There is ample precedent and convincing rationale for applying a
federal preemption standard to state burdens on aliens. The Supreme
Court has recognized the possibility of developing such a standard,
42
37. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (state's power to
apply laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class confined within narrow limits);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73 (1941) ("treatment of aliens, in whatever state they
may be located, [is] a matter of national moment").
38. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (state's denial of aliens' opportunity to earn
living tantamount to denial of entrance and abode). This assertion is cut back, however,
by Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978) (distinguishing between exclusions that
strike at alien's ability to exist in community, requiring strict scrutiny, and lesser exclu-
sions that are within state's constitutional prerogatives).
39. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (federal govern-
ment has broad constitutional powers to regulate conduct of aliens before naturalization,
and state laws imposing discriminatory burdens on entrance or residence of legal aliens
conflict with this power).
40. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 380 (1971) (state alien residency require-
ments that either deny welfare benefits to aliens or condition them on longtime residency
assert a state right to deny entrance and abode, inconsistent with federal policy).
41. See p. 944 & note 24 sukra.
42. As long ago as 1915 the Court recognized the independence of the preemption
argument against restrictions on aliens from the equal protection claim. Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 39, 42 (1915). The Burger Court has often mentioned preemption as an
alternative argument to equal protection in analyzing state restrictions. See, e.g., Nyquist
v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602
(1976). In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court used both doctrines,
preemption and equal protection, stating that either was sufficient to invalidate the
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and several scholars have argued that federal preemption would provide
a conceptually desirable standard for assessing alienage classifications.43
But no court or critic has yet developed a specific, rigorous test through
which federal preemption doctrine might be applied. To establish the
practical viability of preemption analysis, an appropriate test must be
constructed. Application of the test to a variety of burdens that states
have placed on aliens will then demonstrate the ability of federal pre-
emption doctrine to bring order to alienage jurisprudence.
A. Proposed Federal Preemption Standard for Alienage Classifications
To ensure that the superior federal interest in alienage is respected,
an appropriate test must look to federal intent as a measure of the
legitimacy of state burdens on aliens. A standard that can both discern
federal intent and weigh state burdens against those federal objectives
will result in a more consistent and coherent ordering of alienage
classifications. Because any preemption test for alienage classifications
is so closely tied to federal policy regarding aliens, 44 there is no reason
to apply a traditional commerce clause preemption standard.41 More-
statute. Id. at 376, 380. The Court also has expressly declined to reach the supremacy
issue necessary for a preemption analysis because denial of equal protection alone was
held to be fatal to the state legislation. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646
(1973).
43. See C. BLACK, suPra note 6, at 64-65 (paramount national power over aliens leads
to inference of national preemption as appropriate doctrine for assessing most state dis-
criminations against aliens); Perry, supra note 6, at 1063-65 (no state may take action in
manner that would interfere with congressional immigration policy unless such state action
is "deemed consonant" with implicit federal policy regarding aliens). Such an analysis
is too vague, however, to guide a jurist confronted with a difficult case.
44. Cf. Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740,
749 (1942) (intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting police power ordinarily
must be clearly manifested but alien regulation is exception because of its impact on
foreign relations). In matters of immigration and naturalization, any concurrent state
power is restricted to the narrowest of limits. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941).
45. At one end of the preemption continuum, which has evolved primarily in the
commerce clause area, is the case in which Congress acts within an area delegated to it.
There, the preemption of conflicting state or local action-or the validation of congres-
sionally authorized state or local action-is a foregone conclusion. At the other end of the
continuum is the interpretation of congressional silence. This question whether state
authority should be ousted due to possible negative implications of dormant congressional
power is the essence of most commerce clause issues. In between these two extremes is the
category in which states are precluded from acting due to a vacuum deliberately created
by Congress. In this case, the federal legislative scheme is held to declare or imply a
federal intention to "occupy the field." L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at § 6-23. The federal
alienage scheme might be placed in this middle category; the federal interest can be said
to "occupy the field." But see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 UoS. 351, 355 (1976) (every state enact-
ment in any way dealing with aliens is not necessarily a regulation of immigration, and,
therefore, is not per se preempted by constitutional power whether latent or express).
In the commerce area, when federal occupation of the field is at issue, the modern
tendency is to attempt to avoid a finding of federal preemption. Preemption of state
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over, a federal preemption test for aliens should be both narrowly
focused and sufficiently self-executing to overcome the nearly ad hoc
approach to alienage categories that has left the jurisprudence in con-
ceptual disarray.
These concerns are satisfied by the following test:
(1) State laws that disproportionately or discriminatorily burden
legally resident aliens are presumptively preempted by the plenary
federal interest in alienage; (2) a state can, however, rebut the
presumption by showing that its regulation (a) has been authorized
expressly by Congress, or (b) can be analogized to a federal regula-
tion from which an implicit authorization can be inferred.
There are two exceptions to the state's prerogative to analogize from
an implicit federal mandate. First, a state may not place a burden on
aliens if the parallel federal burden is a direct regulation of the im-
migration and naturalization of aliens, or if the federal burden has a
significant impact on foreign affairs .4  Regulation in these areas is en-
trusted exclusively to the federal government, and thus any state ex-
clusion, registration, deportation, or naturalization proceeding would
be impermissible. Second, if the rationale underlying a federal burden
on aliens is national security, the states are enjoined from placing a
parallel burden on aliens because there is no corollary to national
security at the state level.
47
The proposed test applies only to regulations that burden aliens dis-
proportionately. States are not enjoined from enacting regulations that
affect aliens and citizens alike. States are, however, subject to the
direction of Congress, because of its plenary authority over alienage.
Congress, or presumably the executive, can delegate responsibility for
the regulation of aliens, or can authorize the states to regulate aliens or
action will occur only if "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other
conclusion," or if "the Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). This tendency is not absolute, however, see note
58 infra, and in a more clearly national field such as alien regulation the Court is less
likely to tolerate regulatory incursions by the states. L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at § 6-25.
Moreover, the Court has held that the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human
beings are in a category entirely different from commodities that move in interstate
commerce. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 & n.22 (1941).
46. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941) (supremacy of national
power over foreign affairs, immigration, and naturalization is made clear by the Con-
stitution, and no state can add to or take from the force and effect of a federal treaty or
statute in these areas).
47. National security is a by-product of the interplay of national defense and foreign
affairs. It reflects the impact inside America of the defense measures adopted for the
purposes of foreign policy and is a federal concern. H. LASsiWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDom 53-55 (1950).
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to override existing regulation, so long as such authorization comports
with due process.
48
The analogy branch of the test, which legitimates state regulation by
inference from federal policy, rests upon a theory of the parallel func-
tions of federal and state governance.49 Ordinarily, when Congress
places a disproportionate burden on a resident alien, a legislative judg-
ment has been made about the relationship between a particular
government interest and alienage status. Regardless of the merit of the
federal determination, its rationale should be equally valid at the state
level if the state government performs a parallel function.50 Therefore,
if a state chooses to place an identical or analogous burden on an
alien,51 it is acting consistently with implicit federal policy and in no
way derogates from a unified national approach.
The concept of a "permissible analogy" demands further explana-
tion. There often will be little controversy about what constitutes an
analogous or parallel burden: denial of voting in state elections par-
allels denial of voting on the federal level;52 exclusion from state court
48. See L. HENKIN, supra note 32, at 237 (federal-state paradigm in commerce clause
area); cf. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1890) (Congress can permit states to
regulate commerce in ways that could not be upheld were Congress silent). This reasoning
can be extended to encompass regulation of aliens, because of the supreme federal interest
in immigration and naturalization. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62, 66 (1941). One
rationale for this federal supremacy is that Congress determines the terms upon which
an alien is admitted, and also the conditions under which an alien is naturalized. Con-
gress, if it so desired, could transform an alien into a citizen upon entry into the United
States, thereby mooting all state distinctions between citizen and alien. Therefore, Con-
gress retains the authority to direct state action singling out aliens. But congressional
power is not unlimited. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (Congress does
not have power to authorize individual states to violate equal protection clause). There
are constitutional limits on federal classifications; at the very least, aliens are entitled to
due process if they are deprived of a liberty interest. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 101-03 (1976).
49. Cf. Rosberg, supra note 26, at 314 (aliens stand in the same position with respect
to the federal government as they do with respect to the states).
50. See Perry, supra note 6, at 1063-64 (those state alienage classifications that are up-
held can be shown to be consonant with federal policy).
51. Admittedly there may be a fine line between what constitutes a permissible
analogous burden and what constitutes an impermissible additional burden. Some cases,
such as the voting example at p. 954 inira, are easy to resolve; voting at the state level
is identical to voting in federal elections, and the state burden is permissible. Others,
such as the state regulation of illegal aliens upheld in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976) (CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1980), which places sanctions on employers for
knowingly employing illegal aliens, upheld as harmonious with federal law), involve
judicial line-drawing in order to determine whether the state sanctions are analogous to
the federal regime, or additional to it and thereby impermissible. The test respects the
predominant federal interest in alienage regulation, and employs that federal interest as
the corpus from which states can make alienage classifications. Equal protection doctrine
ignores the delicate linkage between state and federal action in the alienage domain.
See p. 944 supra.
52. See notes 65 & 66 infra.
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jury service parallels exclusion from federal court jury service.53 But
the analogy will not always be self-evident.
In difficult cases, a two-step analysis should be applied. First, it is
necessary to ascertain whether there is a federal burden analogous on
its face to the challenged state burden. In the employment area, for
example, such a burden might be the denial of alien access to a given
job function. In such a case, a direct analogy could be determined by
comparison of state and federal job descriptions. 54 This step is func-
tional in that it looks to the function or nature of the burden itself. If
there is no facially obvious analogy, the second step is to determine
whether there is an arguably parallel federal burden whose rationale
is applicable at the state level.55
There are two principal ways in which to discern the appropriate
rationale at this second step. The preferred method is to look to the
legislative or executive intent behind the parallel federal enactments. 56
53. See note 70 infra.
54. For example, if the question is whether aliens can be denied the right to be
custodians in state government buildings, it would be necessary to see if custodians in
federal government buildings fall within the blanket federal prohibition against employ-
ment of aliens in the competitive civil service. If aliens could be employed in federal
government buildings, they could serve as custodians in state government buildings as
well.
An argument could be made that the states are free from such federal mandates insofar
as they exclude aliens from employment with state government. See National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions
impermissibly interfere with functioning of states and their political subdivisions). What
was seemingly dispositive in National League of Cities, however, was that the federal
requirements, the Fair Labor Standards Act, if applied to the states, could have signif-
icantly altered the performance of essential state functions, vitiating the idea of the
"separate and independent existence" of the states. Id. at 851.
The concept of impermissible interference with state sovereignty in National League
of Cities would be less at issue if the question were whether aliens could be excluded
from state government, because a ruling on this subject could hardly impair the inde-
pendence of state government. Unlike the Federal Labor Standards Act, which affects the
employment terms of all employees, the alienage ruling would affect only alien em-
ployees. Because state governments function overwhelmingly on the labor of citizens-
indeed, aliens traditionally have been excluded from many government positions-it is
doubtful that a federal decision ordering the states to employ or exclude aliens from
government jobs would rise to the level of an impairment of sovereignty as did the Fair
Labor Standards Act. But see Maltz, supra note 11, at 690 (National League of Cities
would seem to apply in this context).
55. The second step incorporates the preemption standard developed in Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (test is whether state law in question stands as obstacle
to full purposes and objectives of Congress). See note 71 infra.
56. Although the will of Congress would seem to be the most legitimate expression of
federal rationale, administrators also frequently determine federal policy. See, e.g., note
77 infra (aliens are excluded from employment in FBI by agency itself). Until such
regulations are challenged, they govern federal action and are a legitimate source from
which to determine federal intent. But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
115-16 (1976) (administrative regulation denying aliens right to civil service job opportuni-
ties is impermissible delegation of authority by President or Congress).
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The other possibility is to look to judicial decisions, which regularly
interpret the intent of the other branches regarding burdens on aliens,
in order to determine whether there is a federal rationale that could be
applied by the states. If no relevant federal intent can be inferred be-
cause no parallel federal burden exists, the state regulation necessarily
must fall. 5T Thus, congressional or executive silence or inaction would
be interpreted as a bar to state regulation.s
A complication arises at the second step of the analysis when there
are varied and inconsistent federal policies or rationales from which to
draw analogies.59 In this instance, the appropriate analogy is that which
most favors the alien. This conclusion accords with the basic premise
that states must not burden aliens unduly.60 Also in keeping with this
premise, there is no lower limit on permissible state regulation; states
are free to ignore an implicit federal mandate and to place no burdens
57. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (states can
neither add to nor take from the conditions imposed by Congress upon admission,
naturalization and residence of aliens). The test does not mean that the state cannot
regulate traditional reserved areas such as education or employment, but that alienage
is a federal concern delegated to Congress, and therefore the states are preempted from
making unauthorized distinctions on the basis of alienage. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 30,
§ 6-23, at 376 (when Congress acts within area delegated to it, preemption of conflicting
state or local action flows from substantive source of congressional action plus supremacy
clause).
58. A convincing argument can be made that such a negative preemption standard
is much better suited to state burdens on aliens than to state restrictions on interstate
commerce. Cf. note 45 supra (review of preemption standards). Such a standard might
seem controversial in view of the recent Supreme Court tendency to find preemption of
state law "'only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims'" of
federal law. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)
(quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963)); cf. Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973) (quoting THE FDERnALIsT No. 32 (A. Hamilton)) (state
copyright law to be preempted only if " 'absolutely and totally contradictory and repug-
nant'" to federal law). Goldstein, however, indicates that federal power is exclusive over
matters that are necessarily national in import. 412 U.S. at 554. Few matters are as
national in scope as those affecting international relations, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 68 (1941); the treatment of aliens within a state may well affect international relations
and therefore be a matter of national moment, id. at 73. Moreover, recent Burger Court
decisions have found preemption in areas less federalized than alienage. See, e.g., Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540, 543 (1977) (state statute concerning package labeling
standards may be found to impair operation of federal statute even if dual compliance is
possible). Finally, the Court has recognized that each preemption test turns on "the
peculiarities ... of the federal regulatory scheme in question." City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
59. A preemption formula whereby state regulation burdening aliens would be up.
held if consonant with federal policy, see Perry, supra note 6, at 1063-64, is inadequate be.
cause such a formula would provide no guidance in the case of inconsistent federal
policies. Cf. p. 958 infra (federal policy regarding durational residency requirements
for receipt of welfare benefits is conflicting).
60. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (legitimate interests of state cannot
be so broadly conceived as to bring them into conflict with exclusive federal power).
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on aliens save those prescribed explicitly by Congress or the President.61
Finally, federal preemption would supersede any attempts by states
to regulate illegal aliens. Although there obviously has been no con-
gressional decision to admit illegal aliens, illegal immigration so pro-
foundly affects American foreign relations that any regulatory approach
must yield to the superior federal interest.
62
B. Application of the Preemption Test
State statutes that classify on the basis of citizenship typically do so
in four broad areas: participation in governmental functions, access to
particular forms of employment, ownership of real property, and receipt
of welfare and other public benefits. The proposed preemption test
will yield consistent results in challenges to state statutes in all four
categories and will indicate areas of impermissible state regulation.
1. The Civic Functions Parallel
Underlying the analogy branch of the preemption test is the con-
ception of two distinct governmental entities, federal and state, that
often perform parallel functions. This parallelism enables the state
government to draw analogies between its treatment of aliens and the
treatment accorded by the federal government. Many of the federal
burdens on aliens are imposed on civic functions such as voting, hold-
ing political office, and performing jury service.6 3 These and similar
functions that reflect the identity between a government and the mem-
bers-or citizens-of the polity are particularly well-suited to the pre-
emption test's analogy standard. The federal government has made a
determination that the concept of citizenship, which operates at both
61. There are several reasons for not imposing a "lower limit" on state regulation of
aliens. First, the major concern is that states will impermissibly add to the burdens on
aliens, not that states will not place sufficient burdens on them. In fact, federal policy
encourages states not to interfere with aliens once they have been admitted. Second, if
the state finds itself disadvantaged by a more lenient alien policy, it can tighten up its
policy to the upper limit determined by federal law. Third, if the state benefits because
of its more lenient policy, other states are not prevented from following suit. Finally, if
Congress is dissatisfied with a state's lenient alien policy, it can give the state an explicit
mandate, arguably subject to the constraints of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976). See note 54 subra (discussing National League of Cities).
62. See p. 961 infra; Stepan, The United States and Latin America: Vital Interests and
the Instruments of Power, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 659, 665, 667 (1980) (massive Mexican migra-
tion to United States is foreign policy problem blocking agreement on oil and other issues
between countries).
63. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI (right to vote based on citizenship);
notes 67-69 infra (exclusions from federal offices); note 70 infra (exclusion from jury
service).
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the state and national levels, would be without meaning if not used to
limit direct participation in government. 64
The burdens in this area tend to be facially parallel. Aliens are not
allowed to vote in federal elections,6 5 and, similarly, are excluded from
the franchise in every state.66 Likewise, aliens are excluded from hold-
ing office as President6 7 or as members of the Senate6" or House of
Representatives, 69 and a state bar against aliens holding political office
is equally legitimate.7 0 If specific federal functions excluding aliens are
largely identical to challenged state functions, the existence of the
federal burden on aliens would immunize a state's parallel burden
from legal challenge. In situations where the specific state function is
not directly parallel to the federal function, however, it is necessary to
implement the second step of the analysis by identifying the rationale
that underlies the federal burden.
71
64. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979) (special significance of citizenship
explains why governmental entities, when exercising functions of government, have wide
latitude in restricting participation of noncitizens); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (in differentiating between citizen and alien, Con-
gress intended to do something important).
The "civic functions parallel" is the supremacy clause equivalent of the "governmental
function exception" under equal protection, see note 15 supra; both theories exclude
aliens from participation in state government. The civic functions parallel does so by
recognizing the federal exclusion as an implicit mandate for parallel exclusion by the
states. The logic of the exclusion under equal protection, however, is circular: the ex-
clusion of aliens from the franchise (political powerlessness) triggers strict scrutiny of
alienage classifications, but strict scrutiny is abandoned precisely when a court is review-
ing burdens such as exclusion from the franchise. See Dual Standard, supra note 16, at
1528, 1533. The civic functions parallel, part of the proposed preemption test, is more
logically coherent.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (protecting voting rights of citizens only); 42
U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1976) (same); C. GoRoON & E. GORDON, sura note 26, at § 1.22 (aliens
cannot vote anywhere in United States).
66. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728 (1973); cf. Skafte v. Rorex, 430 U.S. 961 (1977),
dismissing for want of substantial federal question 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976) (upholding
denial of franchise to aliens).
67. U.S. CONS?. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
69. U.S. CONs?. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
70. Similarly, if a state excludes aliens from serving on jury commissions, the exclusion
would survive challenge by reference to the parallel federal exclusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863
(1976). The same syllogism can be used to justify the exclusion of aliens from service on
state-court juries. See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd mem., 426
U.S. 913 (1976) (upholding exclusion of aliens from federal jury service, 28 U.S.C. § 1865
(1976), and from state jury service, on equal protection grounds).
71. An example of the need to resort to the second step of the analogy test is provided
by Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), where the exclusion of aliens from state police
forces should be premised not on a facially parallel federal exclusion (first step), which
does not exist, but on the exclusion of aliens from the FBI by administrative regulation,
manifesting the federal rationale. See pp. 955-56 & note 77 infra. Another illustration is




Aliens are excluded from jobs in the federal competitive civil service
by executive order.72 This exclusion should give states the parallel right
to exclude aliens from state government employment, a result that
would erode the holding of Sugarman v. Dougall,73 which overturned
a flat prohibition on employment of aliens in a state competitive civil
service. Regardless of the merits of the executive order barring aliens
from the federal civil service, the federal policy is as valid on the state
level as on the federal level, and states should be permitted to restrict
state government employment to the same degTee.74
A court implementing the analogy test, however, would allow a state
to draw parallels only from the specific functions affected by the execu-
tive order. Thus, to decide whether a state can exclude an alien from
becoming a police officer, the question presented in Foley v. Con-
nelie,75 a court could not rely exclusively on the policy of excluding
aliens from the federal competitive civil service, which controls no
jobs parallel to police officer.70 A more direct analogy would be to the
exclusion of aliens from employment in the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation,77 which performs many functions analogous to those of state
and local police forces. This analogy would justify exclusion of aliens
from state and local police forces, 78 a conclusion consistent with the
regulation does not exclude aliens from educational assistance. See p. 959 & note 102
infra. This should be treated as evidence of the federal intention, dictating state choices.
72. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979)
(upholding Exec. Order No. 11,935, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1977), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301
app., at 384 (1976)).
73. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). Sugarman, relying on equal protection principles, has created
the anomaly that aliens are eligible for employment in a state civil service but are
excluded from the federal competitive civil service.
74. But see p. 949 supra (states are forbidden to analogize from certain uniquely
federal functions).
75. 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state may limit membership in state police force to United
States citizens).
76. Aliens are excluded from the federal competitive civil service by executive order,
see note 72 suPra, but there is no facially obvious analogy because all positions in the
FBI are excepted from the competitive civil service by 28 U.S.C. § 536 (1976).
77. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, FBI CAREER OPPORTUNITIES (1976) (stating that "[t]o
qualify for FBI employment you must be: (1) a citizen of the United States").
78. Like state and local police forces, the FBI investigates violations of the laws of the
United States, does extensive criminal and identification record acquisition and main-
tenance, and conducts training programs for law enforcement personnel. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85
(1978). Other tasks less readily lend themselves to analogy. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1976)
(FBI aids in protecting President); 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(d) (1978) (investigative work related to
espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities). However, because the blanket exclusion of
aliens from employment is not justified by the federal aspects of these tasks alone, the
exclusion from state and local police forces also would be justified.
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Supreme Court's decision in Foley. The result, however, is reached in
a more direct and internally consistent manner than that obtained by
the Court's carving out of a dubious exception to suspect treatment
under equal protection doctrine.7 9
Federal preemption analysis also yields an easy answer to the question
whether aliens may teach in public schools. Public education is largely
a responsibility of state rather than federal government, and there ap-
pears to be no implicit federal mandate to exclude aliens from teach-
ing.80 Therefore, states could not exclude aliens from teaching jobs in
state-supported schools. Although this reasoning would reverse Am-
bach v. Norwick,s ' which held that nondeclarant aliens could be ex-
cluded from public-school teaching, such a result seems proper, for
citizenship status would occupy a low position on a list of the attributes
that correlate with good teaching.82
Application of the analogy test to private-school teaching, or indeed
to any field in the private sector, would require similar reasoning.
Private economic endeavor traditionally has been regulated by state
law. 3 When it is separately or concurrently regulated by federal law,
as with the federal statutes creating and regulating national banks,84
the federal determination would govern; whether aliens can be em-
ployees in state banks would be determined by the congressional
decision on national bank policy.8 When there is no analogous federal
legislation, however, the states would be barred from disproportionately
burdening aliens in private sector employment. This result not only is
79. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (Court forced to justify argument
that police job is tantamount to public policymaking position and is thus a government
function by maintaining that police officers are given broad discretionary powers). But
cf. id. at 303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (firefighters and sanitation workers hold posi-
tions that also implicate public policy); Equal Treatment, supra note 16, at 1076-77
(portrayal of policemen as officers with broad discretionary authority is disingenuous).
80. In certain instances, such as in the case of dependents of American personnel
abroad, the federal government is charged with the task of public education. Such in-
volvement, however, is an auxiliary of the American conduct of foreign policy and not a
regulation directed at education. Moreover, the federal government abroad often hires
foreign citizens as employees.
81. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
82. See id. at 87-88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (exclusion irrational because it is better
to employ excellent resident-alien teacher than poor citizen teacher and aliens may be
better qualified for certain positions such as foreign language teaching).
83. See, e.g., W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COIRPORATIONS 2 (4th ed. 1969).
84. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1976).
85. The only burden on aliens occurs at the highest levels of national banking as-
sociations: directors of national banks must be citizens. 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1976). Therefore
by analogy, only the right to serve as directors could be denied to aliens in state-chartered
banks.
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in harmony with the federal decision to admit the alien and to put no
impediment in his road toward economic independence and success,
but it also accords with the historic judicial tendency to regard private-
sector discrimination against the alien with greater hostility than dis-
crimination against him in the public sector.
8 6
3. Land Ownership
State regulation of the ownership of land represents a classic area of
state discrimination against aliens.87 Although regulation of land has
been primarily a function of state government, 88 there is no paucity
of federal legislation to examine to aid in determining the legitimacy
of these state restrictions.
The sale or lease of federal public lands to individuals has a direct
parallel at state level, namely, the sale of state lands to individuals. Be-
cause federal policy often requires that the sale or lease of public lands
be restricted to citizens, 9 the states are permitted to place analogous
burdens on aliens.90 There is, however, no federal analogue to restric-
tions on private transfers of land and no indication that Congress in-
tended to interfere with the right of citizens to convey land to aliens.
Therefore, no state should be allowed to prohibit aliens from acquiring
and holding land through private transfers. 91
86. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915) (discrimination invalid because
imposed on participation in ordinary private enterprise and does not pertain to public
sector, participation in which may be limited to citizens of state).
87. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding constitutionality of statute
restricting alien land ownership); 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 101, 105-107
(rev. ed. 1977); Rosberg, supra note 26, at 305.
88. See I R. POWELL, supra note 87, 101, at 377; F. MORRISON & K. KRAUSE, STATE AND
FEDERAL LEGAL REGULATION OF ALIEN AND CORPORATE LAND OWNERSHIP AND FARM OPERA-
TION 29 (1975).
89. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1425(c) (1976) (sales of public lands to individuals may
be made only to citizens and declarant aliens); 43 U.S.C. § 329 (1976) (land patents for
reclamation of desert lands shall issue only to citizens); 43 U.S.C. § 145 (1976) (federal
lands no longer needed for drilling for water may be sold only to citizens).
90. Although there is no need to resort to the "rationale" step of the test, federal
policy seems to authorize implicitly-or at least tolerate-restrictions on the sale of state
lands to aliens. In fact, such state burdens are cited in the House Report giving the
background for the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3508 (1978). H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, rePrinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG, 9- AD. NEWS 2914, 2918.
91. The restriction on the sale of public lands to aliens seems justifiable on the basis
that public lands are owned by the citizens, as citizens. But any restriction on the
transfer of private land to aliens would be seriously under- and over-inclusive as a
classification using citizenship as a proxy for loyalty of landowners, see Rosberg, supra
note 26, at 306, and would make discrimination against aliens an end in itself, see Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). The preemption test prohibits this burden without
reaching the underlying rationale.
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4. Welfare and Public Benefits
The critical issue in the area of welfare benefits is whether the state
can deny such benefits to aliens. This question triggers the analogy
branch of the preemption test because the federal government also is
involved in welfare programs.9 2 But application of the test in the wel-
fare area can be a complex undertaking. A first-level inquiry-searching
for a federal analogy to a state burden-often will be fruitless because
the direct federal analogy will not exist.93 Yet the second-level inquiry-
seeking to determine an implicit federal policy-frequently will be
equally unsatisfying because there may be numerous sources for such
a rationale, and the sources might reflect contradictory intentions.
In Graham v. Richardson,94 the Supreme Court found that no federal
policy authorized a durational residency requirement on alien eligi-
bility for disability payments, and held that the state durational resi-
dency requirements must fall.95 In Mathews v. Diaz,9" however, the
Court upheld a uniform, nationwide residency requirement on aliens
as a condition for receiving federally funded welfare benefits. 97 Con-
trasting the two cases, it is clear that there is no single federal policy
on residency requirements for aliens seeking public welfare payments.
When confronted with more than one federal policy from which to
analogize, the preemption test requires the states to choose the policy
most favorable to the alien.98 Thus states must analogize durational
residency requirements from the Graham and not the Diaz standard, 9
92. The federal government, for example, gives categorical assistance to the states,
administered by the states under federal guidelines. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395qq
(1976) (Medicare supplemental medical insurance program granting eligibility to citizens
65 or older).
93. The concept of parallel spheres of federal and state governance, see p. 950 suf~ra,
breaks down in the welfare area, where federal funding often supplements state welfare
payments, see, e.g., note 92 supra. There are rarely parallel state and federal welfare
schemes; the two levels of government are very much intertwined in this area. It is
therefore generally necessary to look to the legislation's underlying rationale.
94. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
95. Id. at 380-83.
96. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
97. Id. at 82-83.
98. This follows from the test's presumption that states should not disproportionately
burden the alien once the federal government has made the decision to admit the alien.
See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
Another significant fact relevant to the welfare issue demonstrates that this is the proper
way to analogize. Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes which
support welfare programs. It would seem unfair, then, to deny aliens the right to par-
ticipate in programs to which they contribute on an equal footing with citizens. See In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes and support the
economy); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (same).
99. That this standard is most consistent with federal alienage regulation is demon-
strated by the following logic: A uniform durational residency requirement was permitted
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and put no durational residency requirements on aliens seeking public
benefits.
Another type of public benefit that states have tried to restrict to
citizens is financial assistance for higher education. In Nyquist v.
Mauclet,100 the Supreme Court rejected on equal protection grounds
New York's exclusion of nondeclarant aliens from participation in
the state's educational benefits program. Although in Mauclet-as in
Foley-a preemption analysis yields the same result as the Court's equal
protection approach, preemption does so in a more compelling manner.
The preemption analysis involves a second-step test; New York's ed-
ucational assistance program is largely subsidized by the federal govern-
ment,101 and the analogous federal standard governing alien eligibility
does not exclude resident aliens. 10 2 This is taken to manifest a federal
intention that the states should not exclude resident aliens-or the sub-
group of nondeclarant aliens-from educational benefits. To reach this
result under equal protection, the Court was forced to rely on strict
scrutiny 0 3 to find that the state could not exclude even aliens with
no desire to become citizens from a nonessential benefit, 04 reasoning
that barely convinced a majority. 0 5
5. Impermissible State Analogies
The preemption standard precludes the states from any exercise of
concurrent power in areas entrusted exclusively to the federal govern-
in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85-87 (1976), because it was national in scope. There is
no way to guarantee that the states, if enabled to choose their own residency require-
ments for welfare, would all choose the same durational requirement. Therefore, federal
policy mandates that the states choose the least common denominator, which is no
residency requirement.
This analysis is implicit in Diaz, which argues that 1) it is the business of the federal
government, but not of the states, to distinguish between citizen and alien, and 2) states
are not empowered to restrict travel across their borders, whereas Congress is empowered
to exercise such control over national borders. Id. at 85-86. Therefore, federal dura-
tional residency requirements are acceptable; state requirements are not.
100. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
101. This is especially true of the state student loan program, a major facet of New
York's educational assistance. Id. at 3 n.2.
102. Any alien student who is not in the United States for a temporary purpose and
who intends to become a permanent resident is eligible for educational benefits. Id.
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 177.2(a) (1976)).
103. Id. at 7. But see id. at 17-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (strict scrutiny reserved for
"discrete and insular" minorities and not for instant example involving reasonable dis-
tinction within alien class).
104. See id. at 14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
105. The 5-to-4 decision written by Mr. Justice Blackmun generated three separate
dissenting opinions, by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist
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ment, even in certain areas for which analogies to federal policy seem
to exist.
a. National Sovereignty Exclusion
Certain regulations are by their nature so linked to national sover-
eignty that the states are precluded from analogous regulation. For
example, the Pennsylvania alien registration statute challenged in Hines
v. Davidowitz10 6 might seem to exemplify state regulation rendered
acceptable by analogy to the federal statute. The registration of aliens,
however, lies outside the scope of state police power; it is part of the
constitutional duty of Congress "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization."'10 7 Moreover, alien registration is closely linked to the
nation's foreign affairs, which are of exclusive federal concern.1
0 8
Similarly, despite the existence of federal deportation laws, 00 any
state deportation statute would be preempted. The state is barred
from analogizing from the federal legislation because the power to
exclude aliens is inherent in national sovereignty,""0 and the power to
deport is regarded as a corollary of the power to exclude."'
National security is another field beyond the scope of legitimate
state policymaking." 2 Although states seldom have the opportunity to
burden aliens in areas touching upon national security, when they do
analogize from a federal burden that is justified by national security
considerations, the state burden must fall. For example, Congress has
authorized the Federal Communications Commission to issue licenses
to operate radio stations only to qualified citizens or nationals of the
United States," 3 and Maryland has attempted to bolster this statute by
providing that any Maryland corporation operating a radio station
pursuant to federal or state authority may restrict or limit the trans-
ferability, ownership, and exercise of voting rights by aliens." 4 Such a
state provision must fail the proffered preemption test.
106. 312 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1941) (state statute required most aliens to register once each
year, provide any information sought, pay S1 fee, receive alien identification card to be
carried at all times and shown to appropriate authorities on demand, with penalties for
noncompliance).
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72-73 (1941).
108. See pp. 946, 949 supra.
109. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
110. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
111. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
112. See note 47 supra.
113. 47 U.S.C. § 303(l) (1976); see COMMENTS OF THE FCC ON H.R. 8543, reprinted in
[1958] U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEws 4104-06 (concern of legislation was to ensure that
national security would not be jeopardized by those who obtain control of airwaves).
114. See MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 5-703 (Supp. 1979).
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b. Illegal Aliens
Congress has repeatedly tried and failed to enact legislation pro-
hibiting employment of illegal aliens and imposing sanctions on their
employers. 115 Because this inaction can be viewed as evidence of an
implicit congressional policy opposing such legislation, the proposed
test would preempt any state attempt to enforce a regulation barring
employers from hiring illegal aliens. The result would overrule De-
Canas v. Bica,"0 which upheld a California law prohibiting employers
from the knowing employment of illegal aliens. Thus state activity
could not hinder the federal government in its efforts to deal with
illegal immigration as a major element of foreign relations.
In an area such as public education, the states would be prevented
from excluding illegal-alien children from the public schools for want
of an analogy to a federal regulation." 7 Again, any policy toward
illegal aliens calls for explicit federal guidelines because of the need for
national uniformity and the effect of any such regulation on foreign
affairs.
In judging the legitimacy of burdens on illegal aliens, equal protec-
tion analysis is unsatisfactory because of the uncertainty of its applica-
tion to illegal immigration."" As in other areas of state regulation,
the proposed preemption test with its analogy inquiry offers a more
coherent and principled basis on which to distinguish between per-
missible and impermissible state burdens on aliens-both resident and
illegal-than does an equal protection analysis.
115. Congress has been unable to enact any legislation penalizing employers for know-
ingly hiring illegal aliens. Numerous bills are introduced in each Congress, but none
has ever reached a vote. See, e.g., [1979-80] 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 28,163 to 28,275 (96th
Cong.) (seven bills introduced in House but no action taken).
116. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
117. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 591-92 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (federal law does not
authorize states to impose additional penalties on illegal aliens, especially in area of
education). Among the criteria cited by the court in favor of schooling for the children
of illegal aliens was that "the preponderance of the evidence indicates that illegal aliens
do pay taxes." Id. at 588.
118. See, e.g., id. at 579 n.12 (Supreme Court has never held that illegal aliens are
entitled to equal protection of law).
